## JOSEPH B. SALA, Ph.D.

1	A. I believe that's covered in the
2	section.
3	Q. Are you a workplace safety expert
4	also?
5	A. I as it pertains to human factors
6	issues and some of the the decisions and
7	considerations and particularly as it relates to
8	safety information, yes, that would be an area
9	that I have have testified in.
10	Q. You're critical of Seaboard's actions
11	on the date, correct?
12	A. I believe that, yes, there are a
13	number of action decisions that I'm critical of in
14	this report.
15	Q. You're critical of Glen Coggins'
16	actions on the date of this incident, correct?
17	A. I believe that Mr. Coggins
18	unfortunately made some decisions and took some
19	actions that were unsafe and and placed him in
20	the position of of a potential hazard.
21	Q. So that's yes, you are critical of
22	Mr. Coggins' actions?
23	A. Yes. I think that that he many
24	is some of his actions at the time of the

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incident led to the occurrence of this. 1 If you remove the actions of Seaboard 2 Q. 3 and the actions of Mr. Coggins, do you have any criticisms? 4 5 Α. I'm sorry? If you remove the actions of 6 Seaboard -- assume for me a minute you're not 7 8 allowed to testify about the actions of Seaboard and you're not allowed to testify about the 9 actions of Mr. Coggins. Do you have any opinions 10 to give? 11 Yes, I think that -- that I can -- am 12 Α. still addressing the -- the -- the 13 relevance of the -- the warnings and the necessity 14 15 of a warning in this current incident and this current location. 16 And it's your testimony, I think, no 17 additional warning presented on the machine would 18 have affected Mr. Coggins' behavior or actions at 19 the time of the incident. I'm on page 11, the 20 last sentence of --21 Yes. 22 Α. -- the first full paragraph. 23 Q. So they could have had the best 24